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Migration is a human phenomenon impacting various factors of society, politics, and 
cultures today that will continue to grow in both domestic and international importance. Despite 
this profound significance, there are numerous challenges for migration with little control of the 
flow of populations and limited understanding of the changing trends of migration. Historically, 
migration has been defined by South-to-North movements, with the main motive being economic 
opportunities with the allure of developed countries, but many articles today have found more 
South-to-South movements and myriad other factors influencing migratory decisions. By 
examining net migration population from 2014 and 2015, in conjunction with Human 
Development Index scores (HDI) with its variable breakdown from the year 2014, this paper 
attempts to answer the question of what factors cause net migration to increase or decrease. 
Specifically, it will be arguing that states with higher HDI value will have a larger net migration 
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In 2017 alone, there were 258 million international immigrants, 150.3 migrant workers, 
4.8 million international students, 68.5 million displaced individuals, 50 million irregular 
immigrants, 18.8 environmentally impacted individuals, and 25.4 million refugees (International 
Organization of Migrants, 2019). Of this gigantic population 48.8% were female and 14% were 
children (International Organization of Migration 2019). This population also contributed $466 
billion of remittances that were sent to middle- and low-income states (International 
Organization of Migration, 2019). Human migration is a common narrative facing all of 
communities, states, and any other political and social organizations. The universality of this 
phenomenon causes myriad problems nationally and internationally.  
The arguably most affected factors are government institutions and communities – those 
groups of people who are in direct contact and living with migrants – due to the strain of 
resources and inability to manage rising levels of migrants. On the positive side, migration can 
aid in development in both destination and departure countries, especially with the practice of 
“brain circulation” in the framework that international movements are becoming easier with 
technology and information. For instance, in destination states targeted migration policies can 
help fill labor needs in certain economic areas, gender imbalance, and elevate the states’ overall 
development. In the case of departure states, migrants that leave and get a higher education may 
return, which can vastly aid their home states. 
The struggle of governments is therefore obtaining the benefits of migration, rewards that 
usually coincide with positive policies and care towards migrants and migrant communities, 
while maintaining their internal structures and stability. This struggle of balance is due to the fact 
that institutions are man-made; thus, the things that impact and change the makeup of the 
populations impacts these foundations and organizations. This combines with the additional issue 
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of understanding and regulating such a phenomenon that is migration. Reactions against 
migrants and negative social concepts are factors that dictate pressure on policies regarding 
migration, and paired with the fact that migration is such a complicated and extensive issue, it 
can be hard to deal with all the facets of it. The shared trait of states is that migration holds 
monumental consequences at different levels of humanity, from geopolitical organization and 
states’ policies to societal and cultural impacts on the receiving community and migrants 
themselves (O’Reilly, 2012). Human migration holds the potential to become a tragedy of the 
commons and international collective action problem, and both consequences would be dire for 
migrating populations as well as domestic populations. 
Presently, there is a major dialogue reflecting upon the growing number and diversifying 
drivers in regard to global migration. In the face of globalism and changing patterns of 
relocation, economic opportunities, environmental changes, and a developing global system of 
governance and policies regarding migration, the study of migration has become a necessity 
today and for the future (United Nations Development Programme, 2009). An area of contention 
is what factors are truly behind the motives of migrants and the varying roles and significance 
that each generally agreed upon driver holds (Sanderson, 2010). In an effort to explore these 
factors and shed light upon such a perpetual human experience, academic studies and 
governmental research have been created to garner a better understanding of such a permanent, 
global, and impactful event that is human migration (O’Reilly, 2012). This paper explores the 
drivers of migration while trying to gain an accurate picture of which driver to frame in order to 
understand migration flows today. 
In an attempt to add to this field and understanding of such a diverse and pertinent 
phenomenon, my research strives to determine factors behind net migration at a state level to aid 
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states in refining or bettering migration laws, institutions and organizations helping migrants and 
both departure and destination state, and current political and social practices in place. This data 
largely comes from Democracy Cross-National Data set and United Nations Human 
Development Programme: Human Development Reports, and the independent and dependent 
variables used will be from United Nations Development Programmes in the year 2014 and 
2015. This paper will examine how rising levels of the Human Development Index (HDI) scores 
– a indices that seeks to numerically determine the educational, health, and economic well-being 
of states – on a scale from zero to one, impact the changing rates of net migration in states in a 
positive, negative, or possibly insignificant manner. The following results aim to contribute to 
reducing the problems of migration, in reference to the tragedy of the commons and collective 
action issues, and potentially aid migrants in regards to improved governmental 
policies―domestically and internationally―and better prepared communities.  
Review of Literature 
A key component to understanding international migration is looking at the rates of 
human movement at a state level, whether it be departure or retention rates, and trying to discern 
a pattern of such movements. A way to accomplish this is to examine net migration rates. The 
proposed definition of net migration by the United Nations Development Programme is, “net 
number of migrants, that is, the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants. It is 
expressed as thousands” (United Nations Development Programme 2009). This figure is derived 
from state-reported numbers of immigrants and emigrants – those going into the state and those 
exiting the state (United Nations Development Programme 2009). Using net migration, it is 
easier to gain a more accurate picture of the types of movement (entering, leaving, or staying) in 
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states’ populations while seeing how states’ policies and characteristics may impact rates of 
migration positively or negatively.  
Levels of Examination in Relation to Migration 
A factor to consider is how migration drivers have evolved historically and the levels of 
analysis they were studied. Modern migration has been divided into two waves; the first was 
between 1840 and 1914 and the second was 1914 to present, the focus of this paper (Goldin, 
Cameron, and Meer 2011). Each period has its own characteristics, and both need to be 
examined at three levels: micro, meso, and macro (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011). The micro 
level can be understood as the individual’s choice, with a weighing of costs versus benefits 
(Goldin, Cameron, Meer 2011). Meso focuses on networks, societal acceptance, and governance 
policies like the willingness to lower barriers or to help those trying to migrate (Goldin, 
Cameron, and Meer 2011; O’Reilly 2012). Lastly, the macro level examines the role of 
“demographic, economic, and political conditions that exert “push” and “pull” forces” (Goldin, 
Cameron, and Meer 2011: 98).  
Of these three levels, micro and macro were the primary influences, and were commonly 
regarded as the main drivers in the past due to global movements being both more open and 
encouraged by the government and people’s willingness to move, as can be seen in cases of 
colonization (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; O’Reilly 2012). The studying of migration and 
its trends tend to stick to these levels with little interplay, but new academics are pushing to tie 
all three levels together and show the relationships between each level on the migrant and the 
system as a whole, especially when considering the changing situations of states and their 
policies and how these relationships impact individuals (O’Reilly 2012). In the case of the 
second period of migration, new literature recently has begun to switch to this trend of 
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examining migration at all three levels (O’Reilly 2012). The importance of studying migration 
by levels is that it sheds light upon how migration is changing over time, and how aspects of 
each driver influences migrants (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011).    
Drivers of Migration 
 Presently, the conversation around migration and the influences driving human 
movements with increasing recognized diversity, like the impact of intrastate conflict and 
environmental crisis. Generally, migration is being attributed to more specific motives, or 
drivers, and more focus is placed upon the individual’s and government’s roles (Black, Adger, 
Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011). The debate behind the drivers are largely centering around two 
distinctions: migratory patterns for a better life versus forced migrations; in layman’s terms, 
migration driven by focus on general wellbeing versus physical harm (Black, Adger, Arnell, 
Dercon, et. al. 2011). These two groups – choice migration and forced migration – at their most 
basic level can be seen as a reaction against the changing drivers, especially in comparing the 
relevance of new migration drivers and changing situations in the world.  
These changing situations can exemplified by myriad factors. In the case of choice 
migration, rising technological improvements in the sphere of information sharing and 
transportation are aiding these migrations. As for forced migrations, the turn towards intrastate 
conflict, especially since these types of conflict are on the rise and can be as damaging as 
interstate conflicts, increasing environmental crises, and technological improvements – those 
impacting choice migration as well – are all impacting this migration type. These distinctions 
and changes can be added to older migration drivers and even be further broken down along 
more traditional lines of examining migration; this dual reality can be helpful in explaining 
migration and understanding how it is evolving while in the framework of old drivers, which are 
understood fairly well. Commonly, the two groups are developed with attention paid to health, 
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education, and the overture of government involvement and policies versus economic 
opportunities (Lutz 1996). Going along with the new examinations, this section will briefly 
outline the above-mentioned drivers, and it will seek to find the most encompassing and best way 
to determine the main influence on migration today, especially in relation to new drivers. 
Economic Input 
Universally, one of the most agreed-upon drivers of migration is economic interests, 
whether it be people wanting to go to a country with better economic opportunities or people 
staying in economically strong areas (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011; Gorter, 
Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). The role of the economy is significant, especially when examining 
failing states and structural issues, while also having its own migration driving points (Lutz 
1996). As Nayar states, “it is obvious that economics dominates the migration process” and by 
following push and pull motives there is “pull for those higher up in the economic hierarchy and 
push for those at the bottom” (Nayar 2014: 243). This can be derived from the fact that migration 
and the choices that go along with it have positive and substantial impacts on livelihood patterns, 
especially in the case of those coming from less economically developed states (Nayar 2014). 
The largest benefit is alleviation from poverty with large income gains for those who move to 
more economically secure states with better infrastructure and general stability (Nayar 2014; 
United Nations Development Programme 2009).  
This experience aids the historical economic theories that asserted that migrants came 
from Less-Developed-Countries (LDCs) of the Global South and they typically resettled in the 
Global North in More-Developed-Countries (MDCs) (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011). It is 
classified as South-to-North migration (Sanderson 2010). To clarify, the “North is synonymous 
with the industrialized countries where the income, on average, is roughly six times higher than 
in the developing countries, the South” (Lutz 1996: 337). The most common motive was 
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attributed to economic opportunities for migrants in their prospective new countries; in the past, 
these economic opportunities were largely more one way and permanent, but rising regional 
movements and technological improvements are making these migrations more fluid (Lutz 
1996). This can be seen in older literature portraying such moves as “chasing the American 
Dream” and the hopeful futures desired by the migrants. Usually, they would move to countries 
of the Global North because of the economic development found there, and after moving they 
would send back remittances to their home countries (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; Lutz 
1996). Much of these migrations were due to labor needs, which proved to be a major factor of 
increasing modernization (Castles 2009). The migration of populations, especially in the case of 
“brain drain” because of promises of wealth or opportunities in MDCs, would be directed 
towards states with higher economically developed labor systems and economic markets (Castles 
2009).  
While this economic motive of migration is vastly regarded as the main driver and 
therefore applicable, “theories that emphasize purely economic factors fail to capture the broader 
social framework in which decisions to migrate are taken” (United Nations Development 
Programme 2009: 13). Economic theories attempt to explain migration “at an individual (or 
micro) level,” which partially explains migrants’ personal goals but lacks the ability to capture 
the impact of migration as a whole (O’Reilly 2012). This is especially evident with the more 
“modern” versus “historical” roles economics has been playing on migration (Massey 2020).  
According to Massey, “international migrants in the late 20th century generally moved 
from poor to rich countries in order to increase employment, raise earnings, and diversify sources 
of income” and “21st century international migrants increasingly appear to be motivated not by a 
desire to access opportunities but by a need to escape pressing threats to wellbeing from a variety 
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of sources” (Massey 2020: 13). The “variety of sources” Massey references are “state 
disintegration, civil violence, criminal predation, domestic violence, civil warfare, natural 
disasters, political upheavals, and economic collapse” (Massey 2020: 13). As can be seen, 
economic drivers are becoming less and less the main factor behind migration, and while it is 
still an important driver, much of that significance comes from its connection to other motives 
behind migration.  
Health Drivers 
 Beginning with health, a rising importance is being placed upon physical insecurities 
with threats to life and the desire to move to relatively more stable states (Engel and Ibáñez 
2007). Intrastate conflicts and violence are becoming primary motivators when it comes to 
migration, especially in cases of forced and displaced individuals (Engel and Ibáñez 2007; 
Adhikari 2012). Intrastate conflicts and violence are also important when considering the decline 
of hospital infrastructure, which impacts all sectors of society, as well as issues of general 
survival (Adhikari 2012). In states with civil wars, depending on the severity of the violence 
there can be an ousting of certain populations, i.e. religious or ethnic groups, that are forced to 
leave or face direct threats to their lives (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). This is connected with the 
general movement of individuals seeking to find safer and internally structured states (Engel and 
Ibáñez 2007). According to Lutz, “persecution exists in many parts of the world, such as Sudan, 
Myanmar, former Yugoslavia, and El Salvador. Ethnic tensions lead to murder in war times and 
persecution in peace times;” this reflects the threats to survival and lives and helps explain some 
migrations (Lutz 1996: 347). The potential for “improved access for work, civil and political 
rights, and security and health care” are common factors behind these migrations with survival 
and safety being of the utmost concern (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 49). 
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These migrants are generally referred to as refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced 
persons (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Refugees are characterized by the forced migration as a result 
of conflict, violence, or prosecution with the added elements of race, religion, political stance, 
and social status (Engel and Ibáñez 2007.) Asylum seekers are closely related to refugees, but the 
main distinction is legal. Asylum seekers are migrants that have not obtained refugee legal 
status; obtaining refugee status is a process that begins with an asylum seeker, thus asylum 
seekers can become refugees (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Lastly, displaced persons are similar to 
refugees in that they are forced to migrate, but they are pushed out by conflict, environmental, 
and epidemics (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Another difference between displaced persons and 
refugees is the legal protections offered to each group; displaced persons do not have as high of a 
legal obligation tied to their movements, thus they are offered less protections (Engel and Ibáñez 
2007).  
In conjunction with migrations concerning survival and safety, those of the intrastate 
population that do not get pushed out because of immediate threat to their lives or their 
livelihood, oftentimes will eventually migrate due to the failings of the state (Engel and Ibáñez 
2007; Adhikari 2012). With intrastate conflict and violence, there generally follows a breakdown 
in state infrastructure and the sectors that remain commonly cannot keep up with the population 
which puts the general population’s health at risk. A main area impacted by the strain of the 
violence is healthcare systems (Adhikari 2012). Migration in these forced situations can be more 
permanent than other drivers, especially depending on how long the departed state stays in civil 
war and the specific reason migrants choose to leave (Adhikari 2012; Camarena and Hagerdal 
2020). In cases where the violence is ethnically motivated and the migrants are fleeing as the 
discriminated group, even when the state ceases conflict, has economic and social growth, and is 
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relatively much more stable, many of these migrants will not return (Camarena and Hagerdal 
2020).  
In connection to this, the socioeconomic standing of the migrants plays a crucial role 
because typically those who depart more willingly and due to the state’s infrastructural collapse 
will be able to return more easily if they desire because of their stronger social and economical 
state  (Camarena and Hagerdal 2020). These groups depart relative to health concerns of a failing 
state, whether it be from physical threats to life through violence or declining healthcare 
infrastructure. When a state ceases civil conflict, has better control on violence, or generally 
improves the physical security of citizens, these groups commonly can and will return due to the 
conclusion of persecutions, discriminations, and ethnic cleansings which makes the departed 
state safe again (Camarena and Hagerdal 2020). The nature in which these migrants leave is key 
in understanding why and how long they will stay, the best policies for the receiving states to 
utilize, and the political and social changes necessary for departed states to achieve to regain 
migrants or support those who stayed (Massey 2020).  
In addition to intrastate violence in the political and social realms, violence associated 
with drug cartels, gangs, and domestic threats is rapidly increasing the number of migrants 
seeking refuge (Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano 2018; Massey 2020). In Mexico, drug 
violence was linked to 6.4 homicides per 10,000 from 2006 to 2012, while in the U.S. there was 
only 0.12 per 10,000 drug related homicides in that same time period (Orozco-Aleman and 
Gonzalez-Lozano 2018). Overall, a substantial and growing amount of migration is being driven 
by violence, and sometimes the consequential breakdown of states because of it. According to 
Massey, “the total number of forced migrants in 2017 rises to 66.5 million, up from 20.7 million 
in 2000” with “the number of refugees increased by 64% and that of all forced migrants rose by 
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221%” (Massey 2020: 14). Much of this increase has been driven by health concerns, especially 
in relation to general survival (Massey 2020).  
The idea of “environmental refugees” of “people forced to leave their places of origin by 
climate change, severe weather, or the social and economic consequences of these events” is 
another growing migration group (Massey 2020: 14).  Right now, “the influence of the 
environment and environmental change is largely unrepresented in standard theories of 
migration,” and is most definitely not fully captured by the standard answer of economic drivers 
(Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011: 3). A growing number of migrants are having to flee 
their homes due to threats to physical survival from environmental disasters, states’ dire 
responses or inability to combat and aid populations from and after disasters, and also challenges 
to states’ health and social infrastructure due to overall state struggles derived from 
environmental problems (Massey 2020). 
The environmental drivers are characterized as “availability and reliability of ecosystem 
services and exposure” (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011: 3). These relate directly to 
environmental pressure on individuals and their survival- as is the case of rising water levels, 
desertification, declining soil production, natural disasters, and environmental catastrophes. 
(Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011; United Nations Development Programme 2009; Lutz 
1996). Furthering the impact of environmental crises and its impact on health, the indirect role 
these problems have on increasing individuals’ and states’ competition over resources result in 
violence, declining access to resources needed for healthy living, and increasing exposure to 
harsher environments that impact physical security (Massey 2020; United Nations Development 
Programme 2009). Environment also indirectly impacts migration due to how it impacts the 
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other major areas dictating migration, like changing economic practices and jobs which also can 
potentially hurt personal security (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011).  
These negative environmental consequences will only deepen as climate change “is 
projected to increase environmental stress in already marginal lands and to raise the frequency of 
natural hazards,” which means the present threats to survival will deepen and new threats will 
arise (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 45). The role of environmental influence 
is a huge one with “some estimates of the numbers of people who will be forced to move as a 
result of climate change… ranging from 200 million to 1 billion” (United Nations Development 
Programme 2009: 45). It does not help that the majority of environmental catastrophes occur in 
developing countries, in which many states are not equipped to handle such stresses and 
consequences from such events, especially in healthcare responses and lacking health 
infrastructure; since the majority of migrants are from less-developed countries, this will only 
increase the amount of migrants (Lutz 1996). Overall, migration due to environmental factors 
can be summed up by disruptions of “elemental, biological, slow-onset accidents; developmental 
factors; and finally, environmental warfare,” all of which have the potential to cause immediate 
or imminent harm physically to individuals and threaten migrants’ lives (International 
Organization for Migration 2019).  
Educational Evidence 
  Education is another driver of migration that acts as a cross-section between the general 
wellbeing and forced movement (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). In relation to forced migration, 
education-driven migration commonly is found in states that are unstable and suffering conflict 
(Browne 2017). The importance of education in connection to fragile and conflict-affected states 
is heightened when potential migrants have children to consider, and since state conflicts, 
depending on the severity, have the potential to break down a state’s educational infrastructure 
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many will move (Browne 2017). The main role education plays in this breakdown is not 
necessarily acting as a primary driver, but it is a key determinant of where migrants will choose 
to settle (Browne 2017). This ties into concerns of future careers and securities, and in the case 
of young children it often relates to family reunification (Browne 2017). There is a search for 
better educational institutions, and this pursuit is even more evident at university levels in many 
developing states (Browne 2017). Many students will migrate in hopes of attending a better 
educational program and thus securing their future, a fact that is supported by the increasing 
number of student migrants (Browne 2017; Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This point is important 
even in the destination country because it can help indicate patterns of settlement; some 
universities have varying access for migrants, especially illegal migrants, so it can help indicate 
where specific migrants may choose to go (Nair-Reichert and Cebula 2015).  
 Beyond this, in countries with low gender equality, there are larger migration 
populations of women (Browne 2017). Migration is seen as an opportunity and a way to escape 
possible persecution if education is specifically frowned upon for females in certain repressive 
states (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This is also an important indicator for how long a female 
refugee will stay in a receiving country because if, upon return to their departed country their 
educational opportunities cease, they commonly will not return (Dustmann and Glitz 2011).  
Education provides other avenues and protections as well in many developing countries, 
like those in South America and Asia, which view it as a way to overcome poverty (Browne 
2017). It is a way to achieve security indirectly (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This view is done on 
an individual level with migrants comparing opportunities consequentially from migration to 
opportunities spawning from lack of movement (Dustman and Glitz 2011). This comparison 
focuses on how migration opportunities would compare if one chose not to migrate with the 
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potential economic security due to educational attainment of those who chose to migrate 
(Dustmann and Glitz 2011).  
This relationship is further exposed when comparing education attainment between those 
who chose to migrate and those who do not by looking at the generational effects when 
comparing both parties’ children (Ichou 2014). It has been found that migrants who leave and 
obtain higher education usually surpass those who chose to stay, and coincidentally their children 
follow this trend which leads to an overall higher socioeconomic gain and security for those who 
migrate and get more education (Ichou 2014). A reflection of this is that education does play a 
substantial role in migrant choices because they will aim to go to states with relatively better 
education systems, thus improving education levels (Ichou 2014).   
As for the general wellbeing aspects of education, the correlation of movement and 
education can be tied a number of ways. A rising phenomenon currently is “brain circulation,” 
which consists of migrants traveling abroad for specific educational programs to return and 
support their own state and impact its infrastructure (Thomas 2008). This is becoming more 
prominent in states that historically have faced problems with “brain drain,” a trend where 
migrants would be already skilled and not return to the state (Thomas 2008). “brain circulation” 
solves a number of problems for migrants; it allows them to gain necessary skills to promote a 
more secure future for themselves, may permit them to avoid dangerous situations in their home 
state, as is seen with Ugandans avoiding a violent regime, and builds a positive development 
system with human capital that will help their future generations and state (Thomas 2008). The 
phenomenon also is a way to track how long a migrant may stay abroad, which is helpful for 
receiving states to know and monitor (Thomas 2008). Generally, migrants who leave for 
educational attainment but plan on returning seek out education through the university level 
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(Thomas 2008). This gives a general idea on how long migrants from certain states may stay 
with the regard that most will stay until they complete their university training (Thomas 
2008).  Incentivizing “brain circulation” migration is that returning immigrants are more likely to 
be employed compared to their non-migrant counterparts who hold the same educational level 
and training (Thomas 2008). This is theorized to stem from a belief that education from more 
developed institutions in more developed states are given more value (Thomas 2008).  
A last educational note in relation to general wellbeing promotion is the role of 
remittances. Oftentimes these monetary packages come because a parent chooses to migrate in 
hopes to provide funding and better lives for their family members (Cox and Ureta 2003). In 
instances where these funds were apparent, research has shown that investment in education is a 
common expenditure covered (Cox and Ureta 2003). It instills positive opportunities of 
development for the non-migrant members in the home country by offering children the ability to 
attend school in lieu of working and reenforce education infrastructure (Dustmann and Glitz 
2011). It inspires human capital investment in the home country because in cases where 
remittances were present there were typically higher literacy rates and school attendances 
(Dustmann and Glitz 2011). Remittances increase school retention especially at higher levels of 
education and make it more costly to leave school (Cox and Ureta 2003).  
The Role of Human Development Index 
In light of the necessity to be more inclusive and take further considerations in the drivers 
of migration beyond economic development, specifically considering threats to health, 
education, and livelihood, the Human Development Index is a more comprehensive explanation 
for migration. This index operationalizes examining states’ development and the impact a states’ 
development has on individuals; it looks at the state level but sheds light upon the individual 
level as well (United Nations Development Programme 2009). It provides a numerical 
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distinction of the connection between the wellness of a state and the wellness of the population 
living in that state (United Nations Development Programme 2009).  
In understanding the Human Development Index (HDI) values, a working definition and 
background would be beneficial. HDI is a number composed of three main dimensions: long and 
healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living (United Nations Development 
Programme 2009). This breaks down into indicators of life expectancy at birth, expected years of 
schooling with mean years of schooling, and gross national income (GNI) per capita to create 
dimension indices of life expectancy index, education index, and GNI index, which are the 
indices that combine to create the HDI score for countries (United Nations Development 
Programme 2009). The HDI values can be separated into low, medium, high, and very high 
levels, which are the following: low 0-0.499, medium 0.500-0.799, high 0.800-0.899, and very 
high 0.900-1 (United Nations Development Programme 2009). 
The importance of this in relation to net migration, HDI is a more advanced set of criteria 
for determining a state’s development beyond looking at economic development and provides 
insight on why some countries may have different HDI values in terms of domestic policies 
despite similarities in GNI or life expectancy (United Nations Development Program 2009). 
Utilizing HDI scores as a way to explain migration versus examining economic, health, and 
educational development individually provides a more encompassing view towards overall state 
development (United Nations Development Programme 2009). When employing solely one of 
those factors as an explanation for migration patterns there are issues of “false development” and 
a state appearing more stable and advanced than it really is (United Nations Development 
Programme 2009). For instance, some states may have a strong economy but are lacking 
educational and health systems. If a researcher were looking at a state in this situation they 
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would determine that the state is “developed” and therefore an appealing state to migrants. The 
economic development would be “propping-up” the state’s development which paints a false 
idea, but HDI controls for this issue since it accounts for multiple development factors.  
HDI allows for the relative nature of HDI scores and states in a region to be comparable. 
It can show that migrants may not be looking for the most developed state, but one that is better 
than the one that they were leaving. There are also some shortcomings of using HDI in terms of 
inequality, corruption, environmental crises, poverty, and human security, but overall it grants a 
relatively accurate picture and standard idea on what states’ true levels of development are and 
the livelihood populations can expect in that state (United Nations Development Programme 
2009). These shortfalls are also covered in HDI because many of these problems will impact a 
state’s economic, health, and educational systems, and while HDI does not specifically tackle 
these issues, they are incorporated to some degree (United Nations Development Programme 
2009).   In addition to what it directly measures, it also provides insight to governance because 
there is a high correlation between positive government policies and higher HDI scores; it 
connects how and why government policies influence healthcare fields, education systems, and 
economic practices because states’ governments are the most important actors in these sectors 
(Unites Nations Development Programme 2009).  
The largest gains can be seen in the lives of migrants who move from low HDI level 
states to relatively higher HDI level states. This can be seen in the income differences between 
those who stay in low HDI states and those who leave; there was a $13,736 income difference 
for those who move to high HDI states from low HDI states (United Nations Development 
Programme 2009).In the past, this movement was characterized by South-to-North movement, 
but this movement is no longer the most prevalent (Sanderson 2010). There is increasing South-
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to-South movements, and this phenomenon may be connected to HDI levels of states (Goldin, 
Cameron, and Meer 2011). Also, tying into this connection is the individual agency of migrants. 
While migrants are to some to degree forced to move, many migrants now are more involved in 
their choice of where to go (Sanderson 2010). This agency can be  characterized in connection 
with more South-to-South migrations due to the increasing ability of migrants to return and leave 
easier (Sanderson 2010). This ability is connected to the technological developments mentioned 
earlier; in the case of sharing information migrants are able to amplify their agency in 
performing a more informed choice as well as increasing their agency on the ground when 
reaching their new state (Sanderson 2010). With increased agency by migrants, and even on 
behalf of migrants in some cases, South-to-South migrations are becoming more normal.  
In fact, this phenomenon is quickly rising with “one-half of all migrants from developing 
countries now [moving] to another developing country” (Sanderson 2010: 59; Castles 2009). The 
growing argument is that globalization is making this become the new trend due to increasing 
HDI levels for a majority of states- especially in the case of LDCs, and developed countries may 
no longer be the primary receivers (Sanderson 2010; Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). Many of 
the past Southern departure states, individually and as a region, suffered under the Cold War due 
to proxy wars, intolerant and dangerous dictatorships, and being economically behind (Lozano 
Ascencio and Gandini 2011). The Northern states were destinations that escaped these dangerous 
situations and failing infrastructure then, but now, since many of these states and regions have 
settled politically and socially with increased economic growth, they are more attractive for 
regional movements (Lutz 1996). 
 Another aspect to consider in these movements to higher HDI level states is the fact that 
the states that typically have some of the above-mentioned drivers of migration, like intrastate 
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conflict and declining state infrastructures, are states with low HDI scores (Lozano Ascencio and 
Gandini 2011). The movement itself does not automatically mean the highest HDI states will be 
the only receiving states; it means that states with relatively higher scores than the ones migrants 
are leaving will be the target destinations of migrants, hence the reason why current stability in 
past unstable regions is causing more regional movement (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 2009). 
Latin America is an example of this due to the rising rate of development in the region by some 
states and their linked rising HDI scores; this practice will only progress (Lozano Ascencio and 
Gandini 2011). The movements become more regional, contributing the more South-to-South 
migration, and will further the argument that developed states or states with strong economies 
may not be the only places to really consider as destinations, especially when other factors 
besides economic strength are considered (Lozano Ascencio and Gandini 2011). 
 The same trend of migration being based on states’ relative development can be found in 
educational attainment, another factor of HDI and driver behind migration (United Nations 
Development Programme 2009). Furthering this point is “people who move to emerging and 
developing countries, as well as those who move within, tend to gain” and that this is 
contributing to the rising situation of “brain circulation” as well as “brain gain” with HDI and 
economic development levels on the rise (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 49; 
Castles, 2009). For “brain gain,” migrants seek out opportunities educationally in higher-
developed education institutions that generally are in states with higher HDI scores and return 
back to their home country after their education attainment (Ichou 2014). Essentially, destination 
possibilities, the number of people moving, and the amount of times people move, are all 
increasing because they are gaining more than just economic benefits like educational attainment 
(Sanderson 2010; Koser 2010). These educational movements can be connected to human 
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development levels due to the deeper understanding of other factors going along with economic 
development, which is typically improved because of educational attainment under “brain 
circulation” and “brain gain,” and the subsequent technology and expertise moving back to 
countries that need this information (Koser 2010).  
In respect to this, the non-economic drivers of migration apply directly to individuals in 
conflictual situations seeking refuge, increase personal security, and will provide opportunities 
for the future (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). Because of this, states with relatively higher 
levels of HDI scores will be the most attractive receiving states because of their relatively higher 
security (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). The central inputs of the scores of HDI— education 
years and healthcare with life expectancy rates— are some of the main points of focus for 
migrants in these situations, especially when states in crises that have low scores of HDI struggle 
with these aspects (Lozano Ascencio and Gandini 2011; United Nations Development 
Programme 2009). The departure states typically are more unstable and unable to support some 
of the elements going into HDI scores, which impacts their native populations’ lifestyles, 
opportunities, and in extreme cases the lives of individuals themselves (Gorter, Nijkamp, and 
Poot 2009). Due to this, people will migrate to survive these circumstances while seeking out 
destination states with more stability and better infrastructure (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 2009).  
The relative size of the migrating populations will have a large impact on receiving 
states’ future HDI scores due to the states’ ability to handle the wide variety migrations. The 
framework of institutional aptness and the native residents’ feelings will play a large role in the 
support of such migrants, and if either of these aspects are lacking it can spell dire consequences 
for every level of the state and society with the expected decline of HDI scores (Gorter, Nijkamp, 
and Poot 1998). These components will determine the stability of such states after these 
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movements and this will either positively or negatively impact their HDI scores (Gorter, 
Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). A major player in this is states’ political policies and citizens’ social 
standards regarding migration and migrants (Koser 2010). In the international community, there 
has been a move away from interstate to intrastate war in the shape of civil wars, rebellions, and 
general unrest, which is causing different forms of migration, like refugees from persecution 
(Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; Lutz 1996).  
States’ relationships with potential refugees and the barriers that they erect commonly 
cause more illegal migration paired with humanitarian issues, which is a challenge to the state as 
well as society in the sphere of being unprepared to handle migrants and the social rejection of 
them with the added negative to migrants’ lives (Migration and Human Development 2009). In 
conjunction, it arguably cuts down on the potential benefits states may receive from allowing 
migrants to enter (Migration and Human Development 2009). This relationship is beginning to 
be uncovered when comparing states who actively seek out migrants that are prepared with 
governing policies, advocate for social acceptance in the domestic population, and focus on 
social inclusion of migrants (Migration and Human Development 2009). Receiving states who 
seek out migrants typically see a growth in their HDI as a result because they are prepared and 
are harnessing the potential benefits, which creates a positive cycle (Migration and Human 
Development 2009).  
Global Governance and Policy Making Factors Cyclical Nature       
There are myriad ways the policies and social attitudes also influence the flow of 
migrants (Mouthaan 2019). According to Goldin, Cameron, and Meer, “policy shapes the context 
within which potential migrants make their decisions about whether to move, where to go, and 
for how long” and that “most policies are aimed at either increasing or decreasing barriers to 
entry” (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011: 116).The problem with this is numerous factors 
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impede progression of policies, norms, and international systems (International Organization of 
Migrants 2019). These blockages are multilayered with issues of sovereignty, domestic 
rejections, individual states’ unclear objectives, asymmetrical process building (hegemonic 
influence), and the human factor being prominent issues (International Organization of Migration 
2019). A possible solution in this area is the role of information and communication (Kotyrlo 
2019). Increased access to information has cheapened the cost of migration while also allowing 
migrants to find better migration policies for themselves, create international contacts, and form 
communities more easily in their host country (Kotyrlo 2019). Plus, “existing migration routes 
and migration networks abroad facilitate the flow of refugees” (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 
2011: 115).  
In response to this rapidly increasing flow and challenging situations, lagging 
government policies are playing a role. Many different actors outside of individual states are 
striving to fill this gap and are beginning to reshape ideas about borders and migration (Stock, 
Ustubici, and Schultz 2019). The already-present migration policies are being “confronted, 
succumbed, modified, and contested” by potential and current migrants, social organizations, and 
civil society actors to challenge how borders and legal roadblocks are sometimes unfairly in the 
way of migrants (Stock, Ustubici, and Schultz 2019: 1). This outside influence is not only on the 
defensive or supportive side of migrants with many receiving states’ citizens calling for policies 
restricting migration (Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). The increasing illegal migration and the 
consequences of such responses involve rising nationalism and xenophobia, degrees of 
“foreignness,” acculturation, and assimilation issues for migrants (Migration and Human 
Development 2009; Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; O’Reilly 2012).  
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A rising trend is how terrorism is impacting social attitudes and acceptance of migrants 
(Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). Even when the terrorism is not in their own state and is not 
directly linked to refugees or migrants, public opinion in many receiving states will shift to 
become less open and kind towards potential migrants, those already there, and the possibility of 
providing aid to migrant communities (Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). Thus, to counter 
potential terrorist attacks in their state, many civil groups will begin to voice their negative 
feelings towards migration and will push the government to create more restrictive policies 
(Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020).  
Due to the complex nature and role that states’ policies play in migration, it has been 
shown that states with migration policies aimed at supporting migrant communities generally are 
better prepared (Lutz 1996). The significance of this relationship is that when states are better 
prepared, even in some cases states asking for migrant populations like Germany, they typically 
reap more benefits from having migrants (Lutz 1996). This is not to say that the negative impacts 
of migration, like social conflicts and resettlement crises, are not felt, but the state is more 
prepared to control and tackle these problems, which in turn allows them to benefit the state 
overall, stabilize non-migrant inhabitants, and provide direct aid to the migrant populations 
(Dustmann and Glitz 2011).  
From this, it has been found that states that are progressive with migration policies will 
see an increase in their HDI scores, and states that lack prepared and adjusted policies will 
decrease in HDI (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). The states that see a decrease in HDI scores in 
relation to their migration policies often have more of the negative impacts of migration, such as 
xenophobia, heightened nationalism, and even political polarity, with the potential positive 
impacts from migration being repressed (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). Thus, there is a distinct 
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circular relationship between governments’ policies regarding migration and the benefits 
received from mobile populations. For states that had progressive policies, their HDI generally 
increases, which can make them appear a better destination to future migrants, and since they 
capture more benefits, these states should continue to make positive migration policies 
(Dustmann and Glitz 2011). On the flip side, states with reactive policies typically see a decrease 
in HDI, which may make them a less appealing destination for migrants, and as such states face 
more of the problems of migration, they may be reluctant to accept future migrants (Dustmann 
and Glitz 2011). 
As mentioned, migration is occurring at unprecedented levels on a global scale, which 
inhibits single state controls and effectiveness, causing myriad diverse consequences: 
exploitation, lack of protections, inequality, disappearances, illegal movements, welfare, etc. 
(Koser 2010). As a result of these consequences, many migration policies are becoming 
humanitarian concerns and capturing public concern more (Lutz 1996; Koser 2010). Another 
reaction has been an increased call for international cooperation, and many institutions have been 
stepping in to help resolve this international problem through either acting themselves- like 
Amnesty International- or creating a forum of discussion and trying to formulate international 
agreements  (Koser 2010; United Nations Developmental Programme 2009). The European 
Union is such an organization seeking to step in and relieve some of the pressure on individual 
states, especially because of the porous nature of EU borders (Zanker 2019). 
 In an attempt to help manage rather than control migration from Africa flowing into 
Europe, the EU is beginning to work more closely with some African states, like Ghana and 
Senegal, as well as organizations, like the African Union, covering migration to adopt better 
policies (Zanker 2019). Many committees in the United Nations are concerned with “liberalizing 
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and simplifying regular channels, ensuring basic rights for migrants, reducing transaction costs 
associated with movement, improving outcomes for migrants and destination communities, 
enabling benefits from mobility, [and] developing national strategies” (United Nations 
Developmental Programme 2009: 95). Overall, there is a direct connection between 
governmental preparedness, social acceptance, and general migration understanding, and as such 
the more that governments and societies understand about migration, the better implementation 
of policies and positive benefits are created (Lutz 1996). 
Controlling for other possible explanations, the positive relationship between net 
migration rates and HDI scores will showcase the impact HDI levels have on migratory patterns 
and states’ characterization of being a destination or departure state. In connection to this theory, 
the changes in migration destinations of more South-to-South movements while in the 
framework of the modernizing world, it would be beneficial to study how shifting HDI levels of 
states may dictate migratory choices. 
Methodology 
Since the aim of this paper is to research how HDI scores influence net migration rates, it 
employs HDI scores from 2014 and net migration rates from 2014 and 2015 to track the 
potentially positive relationship. Both variables are at a state level and on a ratio scale with net 
migration detailing a country’s overall migration population per 1,000 and HDI scores indicating 
a country’s level of development on a scale of zero to one. Despite the state level data, both 
variables also interact at the individual level by showcasing individual’s movements and the type 
of livelihood individuals can expect due to HDI scores. The reasoning behind utilizing HDI 
scores in an attempt to answer migration questions and its connection to development is that HDI 
gives a fuller view on state development beyond economic rates, like gross domestic product 
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(GDP), which commonly has been the main marker behind development. It produces a larger 
view on what development truly is, and it looks at other appeals of states beyond just economic 
strength. The HDI values range from low, medium, high, and very high levels, which are 
differentiated as the following: low 0-0.499, medium 0.500-0.799, high 0.800-0.899, and very 
high 0.900-1 (United Nations Development Programme 2009). No state scores zero, and likewise 
they do not obtain perfect scores of one either. Below are the descriptive statistics for HDI scores 
in 2014. 
Figure 1: HDI Scores 2014  
               Number of cases 
Minimum 0.34 185 
Maximum 0.94  
Mean 0.6845  
Range 0.61  
 
For net migration, the rates allow both aspects of human migration—emigration and 
immigration— to be incorporated and see that some states have a lot of movement in spite of low 
levels of immigrants or emigrants. This number is derived from the totals of immigrants 
subtracting the total of emigrants into a given state per 1,000. It essentially measures population 
change and shifting demographics in states. It showcases flow trends for states, regions, and the 
world. When combining these two elements it allows the research to examine what aspects are 
most enticing for migrants and how states’ relative HDI scores may encourage movements when 
looking at other states in the region. Net migration rates can be very reactive and change quickly. 
Thus, year-to-year comparisons of net migration rates can be very different. The table below 
includes the general descriptive statistics for the years 2014 and 2015—the two years that this 




Figure 2: Net Migration per 1,000  
 2014 2015 
      Number of Cases      Number of cases 
Minimum  -15.7 183 -54.7 184 
Maximum 59.2  54.7  
Mean 0.3623  0.1266  
Range 74.9  109.4  
   
The two variables that this research paper is using are the Human Development Index 
(HDI2014) values by state as the independent variable and the net migration 
(UNDP_Migration2014) rate by state as the dependent variable, with both being from 2014 for 
the primary analysis. Both the independent and dependent variables’ data come from the 
Democracy Cross-National Data set. Democracy Cross-National Data is extremely extensive due 
to its state-by-state information with many of the sources being from reliable organizations. The 
HDI variable comes from an extensive mathematical and logistical program run through the 
United Nations. The net migration variable comes from the United Nations as well, specifically 
the United Nations Development Program for Human Development Indicators. 
The reliability of the data organized from such an organization is high because nearly 
every state in the world participates, barring North Korea. Plus, the findings for each state are 
published publicly, which means the data is easy to study, there are a multitude of related 
research articles and books on the topic, and anyone can replicate this study. There are many 
cases to choose from, which will aid in determining the relationship between the variables and if 
outside conditions are affecting certain results or states. This means that there are more cases and 
opportunities to determine if the variables have a similar relationship all around the world, not 
just regional phenomena. 
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 In conjunction with the reliability of the data, the validity of the variables is consistent. 
The HDI data may be considered more valid due to the factors that go into determining the 
numerical ranking, but the net migration variable is also strong. The main point of contention 
behind the net migration variable is that migration is very difficult to trace for any state and some 
states may not have the operational capacity or resources to accurately track migration, 
especially in the case of illegal migration. Also, both variables collect data from state reports, 
which may cause issues of state transparency and doctored findings due to what states report. 
Despite this, the variables are strong due to the United Nations being the institution behind the 
data collection, and analysis and determining the actual values without state reports or input 
would essentially be impossible.  
The research will examine how the rising HDI value, a ratio scale from zero to one, 
impacts the increase or decrease of net migration, another ratio scale. Other variables include net 
migration rates from 2015 and a breakdown of HDI scores from 2014 with GNI per capita, 
literacy rates for those 15 and older (UNDP_literacy15), and life expectancies 
(UNDP_Life2014). The last two variables are from the Democracy Cross-National Data set and 
the others are from the United Nations Human Development Programme: Human Development 
Reports. For net migration rates from 2015, it too is measured per 1,000 in states’ populations 
and its descriptive values are mentioned above in figure 2. As for GNI per capita, this value is 
derived from a state’s final income for the year divided by its population. Similar to net 
migration, there is a span of values that states can have with this variable. This can be seen in the 
table below, which highlights the general values of the GNI per capita from 2014, the year this 




Figure 3: GNI per Capita 2014 
             Number of Cases 
Minimum  730 180 
Maximum 123250  
Mean 18326.6  
Range 122520  
 
  The other HDI breakdown variables are also important to shed light upon. In the case of 
literacy rates, the values for this variable are generated by state-reported information on literacy 
rates for their population above the age of 15. This is computed by taking the number of literate 
individuals divided by the total number of people in that age demographic. The values of literacy 
rate at its lowest can be zero, while at its highest 100. Literacy rates generally are seen as a way 
to measure the efficacy of a state’s education system. 
Figure 4: Literacy Rate 2014 
          Number of Cases 
Minimum  25.3 145 
Maximum 100  
Mean 81.7855  
Range 74.7  
 
Another state reported number is life expectancy. This value is determined by an 
aggregate population total of ages of those at the time of death, and this number is projected onto 
those at birth for their “expected” years to live. The age in years are only predictive values. This 
variable is impacted by a variety of factors, like nutrition, medical practices and availability, and 
presences and prevalence deadly violence. Overall, it indicates the strength of a state’s healthcare 
system.  
Figure 5: Life Expectancy 2014 
           Number of Cases 
Minimum  45.56 189 
Maximum 83.58  
Mean 70.3434  




As for control variables, there will be three different groupings. The first is concerned 
with the demographic of states with percentages of refugees in a population (UNDP_Refugees) 
and the percentage of the population that is already foreign (Migration_Pop). The percentage of 
refugees is calculated by dividing the number of refugees by the general populace of a state; the 
percentage of foreign population is measured by dividing the number of foreigners, or those not 
born in the particular state, and dividing by the state’s population. The second set of control 
variables is the states’ regime type (fhcat14). This variable is measured by Freedom House, an 
organization that examines states’ governmental institutions. This variable is composed of 25 
indicators, like electoral process, political participation, functioning of the government, and 
more, that are aggregated to create an index of the strength of a state’s democracy. It is on a scale 
of -4 to 100, the -4 coming from an extra optional indicator, like ethnic cleansing. The scores 
states receive are subdivided into three levels: free, partly free, and not free. Scores from 71-100 
are free, scores ranging 40-70 partly free, and scores from -4 to 39 are not free. 
The third control group examines inequality and perceived corruption (UNDP_Gini2014 
and CPI2014). The Gini coefficient captures inequality in states by determining income 
inequality for states; it measures this by comparing if income was distributed equally among 
individuals versus the reality of income distribution. The gap between income equally distributed 
and the how income is actually distributed is the Gini coefficient. States score on a scale of zero 
to 100. Generally most states reside between 20 to 70. The scale is divided, with zero to 19 being 
near perfect equality, 20-29 being relative equality, 30-39 being adequate equality, 40-50 a large 
income gap, and 50 and above being severe income inequality.  The last variable, corruption 
perception index, determines how corrupt states are seen in their public sector and apply a score 
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from zero to 100 on that perception. The index is created by a panel of experts that examine a 
multitude of issues, like freedom of expression, openness to civil society, uncontrolled media, 
and more, to determine the corruptness of states. States are given a score from zero, being very 
corrupt, to 100, being very clean or lacking corruption. All the control variables come from the 
Democracy Cross-National Data set and are measured on a ratio scale. 
The primary analysis will run a regression analysis examining the relationship between 
net migration and HDI scores from the year 2014. Following this analysis, a lag model will be 
run with HDI scores from 2014 and net migration rates from 2015. After exploring HDI scores 
as a whole, another set of regression models will be run that breaks down the components of HDI 
scores. The first model will utilize net migration rates and GNI per capita, literacy rates, and life 
expectancy – all from 2014, and the second model will be a lag analysis with the net migration 
data from 2015 and GNI per capita, literacy rates, and life expectancy still being from 2014. 
After these initial analyses, the controls will be implemented.  
There will be four analyses run with the controls. The first model will be in a regression 
model with net migration and HDI scores from 2014. The second model will be the controls in 
the lag framework with HDI scores from 2014 and net migration rates from 2015. The third 
model will place the controls with the broken-down variables of HDI scores and net migration 
from 2014. The last model will be a lag model with the broken-down variables from 2014 and 
net migration from 2015. In analyzing the output from these tables, special attention will be paid 
to the adjusted R-squared values; this is due to the desire to uncover the correlation between the 
dependent and independent variables, and discovering what that relationship looks like. Also, the 
ability of adjusted R-squared in exposing predictability will help determine the importance of the 
relationship between the variables. 
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This paper is attempting to determine the relationship between HDI and migration rates, 
whether it be an inverse or positive correlation relationship. These variables were chosen due to 
their strong connection regarding influence and already extensive knowledge of both. Due to the 
connected nature of the variables, it may be hard to distinguish the exact nature of the 
relationship and whether or not migration also affects HDI levels. In concurrence with this, there 
are many other conditions that may impact migration as well, some of which are controlled for 
with the added control variables. Despite this, there are numerous factors, like foreign aid, states’ 
diplomatic relations, and states’ proximity, which may hold a significant impact on international 
migration rates and patterns. This is commonly the case with international studies and cases, and 
as such should be taken into account for any findings. 
Analysis 
After examining the role HDI scores and HDI scores’ breakdown variables on net 
migration in both 2014 and 2015, the proposed relationship between HDI scores and net 
migration rates can be determined. The first table is this research paper’s analysis baseline 
findings with running a linear regression between net migration rates from 2014 and 2015 and 
HDI scores from 2014.  
Relationship of Migration Rates with HDI Scores: 2014 and 2015 
Table 1: Net Migration and HDI Scores  
  2014     2015  
 Coefficients P-Value  Coefficients  P-Value 
Constant -8.041  0.001   -0.690  0.842 
HDI Scores 2014 12.235  0.000   1.261  0.798 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.063     -0.005   
N= 180      N= 174   
* When HDI and its component variables are included in the same model, VIFs exceed 10, 
which means multicollinearity exists and they cannot be included in the same regression model.  
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HDI scores are significant, which demonstrates support for the alternative hypothesis that 
HDI will impact migration rates. This significance is represented by the p-value, which is 0.000 
for 2014 HDI. This value is under the .05 threshold so it supports the acceptance of the 
alternative hypothesis. The data also supports the idea that the relationship would be positive, as 
can be by the figure 12.235 per 1,000 in a population. This means that for every one point 
increase in HDI scores, the net migration of states that see this increase can also expect 12.235 
more migrants, whether it be from increasing immigrants or more retention of potential 
emigrants. When applied, this effect ranges depending on states’ HDI scores. For instance, the 
country with the lowest HDI score in 2014, Niger with .34, would expect approximately a 
population change of 4.16 population change per 1,000. On the opposite end, the state with the 
highest HDI score, Norway with .94, would expect 11.5 population change per 1,000. These 
numbers showcase the range of the effect on net migration in relation to states’ HDI scores. The 
strength of these numbers though, and their ability to fully explain migration rates, is not very 
high. 
This can be seen when examining the adjusted R-square value, which provides insight 
into the predictability of the figures. This analysis provides only 6.3% of an explanation of the 
variation in migration by supposing that HDI scores are the main cause. Due to this extremely 
low predictability value of only 6.3%, it is necessary to examine how HDI compares to other 
potential factors that may impact net migration, as is shone in the lag model with a one-year 
linear regression gap between HDI scores of 2014 and net migration rates of the following year. 
The relationship between HDI scores and their impact on net migration rates a year later is not 
significant and counterintuitive in explaining the relationship between the two variables. First, 
the impact of HDI scores on rates of migration has decreased sharply to only 1.261 more 
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migrants as HDI scores increase one point rather than the 12.235 increase of migrants when the 
variables are from the same year. This number 1.261 is even less important because it is not even 
statistically significant with a p-value of .789, which is much higher than the .05 threshold of 
significance. Another factor that displays the lack of relationship is the -.005 adjust R-squared 
value. The negative nature of this number expresses that there is not a relationship between the 
two variables and to assume a relationship between them is incorrect. The variability of the 
change in migration rates between 2014 and 2015 cannot be explained at all by using HDI scores 
from 2014. 
Since table 1 does showcase a significant relationship between HDI scores and net 
migration with some predictability, yet it also conveys in the 2015 column opposite findings, 
when examining HDI scores and migration rates between years, a breakdown in the values of 
HDI may indicate what is really impacting net migration rates. This first step towards 
determining the important values and roles of certain variables in HDI scores can be found in the 
next table, which analyzes GNI per capita, literacy rates of those 15 years and older, and life 
expectancies in states in both 2014 and 2015. 
Migration Rates Relationship with HDI Scores Breakdown: 2014 and 2015   
Table 2: Net Migration and HDI Breakdown 
  2014    2015  
 Coefficients   P-Value  Coefficients  P-Value 
Constant -8.620  0.084  -4.800  0.394 
GNI Per Capita 2014 -0.0001579  0.600  0.000248  0.000 
Literacy Rate 2014 -0.014  0.742  -0.066  0.160 
Life Expectancy 2014 0.135  0.157  0.093  0.388 
Adjusted R-Squares 0.001    0.293   
N= 134     N= 131   
 
When breaking down the HDI variable into its three main components, there is a clear 
distinction between which elements are affecting net migration and which are not. In the case of 
35 
 
the above table, it is shown that all the breakdown variables are not only insignificant, but also 
have an incredibly small impact. Starting with GNI per capita, it is insignificant with a p-value of 
.600. The next two variables are just as insignificant with literacy rates being .742 and life 
expectancy being .157. With all of the variables being insignificant, it is not surprising that the 
adjusted R-squared value is .001, which means it predicts one percent of the variability of the 
effect of these variables on net migration. This extremely low number dictates that these 
elements broken down lack an important relationship with net migration. 
Interestingly, the fact that these variables hold no influence over migration rates further 
supports the connection between net migration and HDI scores in itself. It supports the idea that 
HDI scores as indices are distinctly different from the components that are the makeup of it, thus 
explaining why there is a difference in the significance and relationship when going from HDI 
scores versus the breakdown variables of HDI scores. In comparison to table 1, HDI scores as 
indices at least were statistically significant and did provide minimally more insight to the 
relationship between HDI scores and net migration with an adjusted R-squared percentage that is 
6.2% higher. Despite this, there is still a large gap in understanding this relationship, which table 
2 tackles with a lag linear regression model. 
In analyzing the role that the one-year lag plays on the relationship between the 
breakdown variables and net migration, the first notable thing is that one variable, GNI per 
capita, is statistically significant with a p-value of .000. Making this finding even more important 
is that the other variables are not statistically important with literacy rates having a p-value of 
.160 and life expectancy having a p-value of .388. As for the impact of GNI per capita, it is also 
interesting that there is such a small connection between increasing or decreasing net migration 
because the coefficient is .000248. In the case of states with low GNI per capita, like Democratic 
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Republic of the Congo with a GNI per capita of 440 USD, they can expect .10912 migrants per 
1,000. Conversely, in states with high GNI, like Qatar with a GNI per capita of 123,250, they can 
expect approximately 31 migrants per 1,000. This slight increase in GNI per capita conveys its 
smaller effect on migration rates, but this may tie into the differential nature of the net migration 
variable. It also should be remembered that this small effect is applied by per 1,000 in the 
population, so depending on the population size of the state this effect can become quite large. 
Since net migration is determined by subtracting emigrants from immigrants and the coefficient 
is .000248, this may denote a high degree of mobility of those who are choosing to migrate. It 
also may be tied into more regional movements because of the relativity of HDI scores, along 
with their makeup components, and the nature of regional movements, which tend to be highly 
mobile with people moving back and forth quickly and seeking better opportunities in a close 
place. 
Another notable factor for this linear regression model is that the adjusted R-square is 
.293, which is much higher and illuminating on the relationship between the variables than the 
previous adjusted R-squared values. The value in this case denotes that the variables in this 
model are able to explain 29.3%, and while this number is still low, it is a markedly larger 
insight to the connection between these variables and their relation to net migration in a one-year 
lag framework. It highlights the fact that while the HDI score factors are unimportant during the 
same year, their impact does shift over time and their relation with the dependent variable of net 
migration. Despite this impact, there are numerous issues that need to be controlled for, which 





Migration Rates Relation with HDI Scores in a Control Framework: 2014 and 2015 
Table 3: Net Migration and HDI Scores with Controls 
  2014   2015 
 Coefficients  P-Value  Coefficients  P-Value 
Constant -6.666  0.002  -20.325  0.018 
HDI Scores 0.789  0.689  0.248  0.976 
Refugees 2014 (thousands) -0.017  0.000  -0.005  0.674 
Foreign Population 2005 0.113  0.001  -0.036  0.789 
Regime Type 2014 1.463  0.000  4.947  0.003 
Gini Coefficient 2014 -0.006  0.815  0.127  0.217 
Corruption Perception Index 2014  0.080  0.000  0.172  0.035 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.563       0.061     
N= 91     N= 87   
The relationship between net migration and HDI scores when controlling for other 
possible factors changes greatly from the relationship when controls are not included. The HDI 
score variable goes from being statistically significant to insignificant, at a p-value of .689, and 
other variables impact net migration more. Of all the control variables, refugee population per 
country of origin, foreign population per state populace, regime type, and the corruption 
perception index are relevant in affecting net migration values. With p-values of .000, .001, .000, 
and .000 respectively, each of these variables impact migration in different ways. Of the four 
significant values, foreign population, regime type, and corruption perception index cause more 
migrants as their values increase with values of .113, 1.463, and .080. This means that a state 
with higher foreign populations, the more “free” a regime is politically and civilly, and a state 
with a higher score on the corruption index, denoting a “cleaner state,” will be more attractive as 
a destination country, which is relevant for migrants who have more agency to choose their 
destination and helps migrants who lack the freedom to choose to settle in better. 
Conversely, especially since the foreign population variable is positive, the more refugees 
a state receives the less attractive the state becomes as a destination with a value of -.017. 
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Another interesting value in this table is the adjusted R-square, which is .563. This value is 
substantially higher than all the adjusted R-squared values from the tables above and since it 
amounts to a predictability of 56.3% in covering how these variables impact migration rates, it is 
a strong indicator of the relationship between the significant variables and net migration with the 
ability to predict future or other movements by using those variables. 
In connection to this relationship, the lag model data of 2015 on the migration rate is 
noteworthy to see if these shift in significance – a trend seen in table 1 with the year lag. 
Table 3 showcases that HDI scores are still insignificant, a carryover from table 1 and its lag 
model, even when there are controls added. HDI scores have a p-value of .976, much higher than 
the .05 threshold, thus making it unimportant when it comes to influencing migration rates. 
Different in 2015 than in 2014 is the fact that only two of the controls are statistically significant 
– regime type with a p-value of .003 and the corruption perception index with a p-value of .035. 
The relationship with migration stays positive and even increases for both in connection to 
migration with a value of 4.947 for regime type and .172 for corruption perception index. 
Overall, this linear regression analysis, despite the impact of regime type and the corruption 
perception index, is not a good indicator of what influences migration as can be seen with the 
6.1% value of the adjusted R-squared. This low value and the lack of HDI scores’ influence is 
further explored in the next table, which runs a linear regression analysis with the HDI scores’ 







Migration in Relation to HDI Breakdown Variables with Controls: 2014 and 2015 
Table 4: Net Migration and HDI Breakdown with Controls 
  2014   2015 
 Coefficients  P-Value  Coefficients  P-Value 
Constant -5.63  0.039  -30.007  0.004 
GNI Per Capita 2014 -0.000002308  0.826  0.000227  0.000 
Literacy Rate 2014 0.007  0.670  -0.088  0.177 
Life Expectancy 2014 -0.007  0.860  0.213  0.164 
Refugees 2014 (thousands) -0.016  0.000  -0.005  0.553 
Foreign Population 2005 0.179  0.000  0.007  0.960 
Regime Type 2014 1.093  0.008  4.181  0.007 
Gini Coefficient 2014 0.020  0.434  0.116  0.219 
Corruption Perception Index 2014  0.047  0.063  0.185  0.053 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.562       0.419     
N= 70     N= 68   
 
         This table somewhat continues the statistical significance pattern seen in table 3 in 2014 
with the variables of refugee population per country of origin, foreign population percentage, and 
regime type all being significant. The corruption perception index is no longer statistically 
significant when the regression is run with HDI component variables and net migration in 2014. 
With p-values of .000, .000, and .008, they are the only values on this table that are statistically 
important, which also follows along with the trends from table 1, which showed how the HDI 
breakdown variables were all insignificant as well. Also carrying over from table 1 is that the 
nature of each variables’ relationship does not change. The coefficient for refugees is still 
negative, while the foreign population and regime type are still positive. Interestingly, the 2014 
data does diverge with table 1 in that the adjusted R-squared value is much higher, and thus, 
making the statistical relationships in this table much stronger. The .562 value of the adjusted R-




Another noteworthy characteristic of this value is that it acts conversely from table 2. The 
extremely low adjusted R-squared value in that table for the year 2014, .001, is completely 
flipped when running the same HDI breakdown variables with the same year net migration rates 
with controls for a value of .562. This huge increase without a change in significance for the HDI 
breakdown variables showcases just how much the control variables are explaining the rates and 
possibly patterns of net migration, thus making HDI scores seem further removed. This is not 
completely the case, though; HDI scores and their influence can be seen in the lag year model 
when net migration is from 2015. 
Migration in the above regression output is chiefly influenced by the GNI Per Capita 
variable, as can be seen in the .000 p-value, and by the fact that only one of the other control 
variables have statistical significance, regime type with a p-value of .007, which has consistently 
been significant. This draws light to the fact that none of the last few variables – refugee 
population, foreign population, and the corruption perception index – were significant. This is an 
important shift because of all the data from the tables with the control variables accounted for, 
this is the only one where at least one of these independent variables is significant while only one 
control variable is significant. Paired with this, the fact that only GNI per capita is significant out 
of all the component variables of HDI scores highlights its more direct role and relationship with 
net migration. The other breakdown variables of HDI scores, literacy and life expectancy, are 
still not statistically significant, which follows the trend from table 2. It also provides further 
support of the relationship of the importance of GNI per capita when applying a year lag, as can 
be seen in the differing statistical importance in table 2 for both 2014 and 2015. 
Along with this, the prominence of the connection between GNI per capita and net 
migration is amplified by the adjusted R-squared value of .419, or 41.9%. This value is larger 
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than that in table 2 for 2015, and emphasizes the significance of GNI per capita, especially when 
all other variables are insignificant except regime type. The fact that the coefficient is still 
.000227 echoes the idea that migration movements are extremely mobile between states and the 
possible factor that movements are being done regionally. Also, keeping in mind that this effect 
is applied per 1,000 in a state’s population is key due to the relevance of population rates. Putting 
this into perspective with the two GNI per capita cases above, when GNI per capita’s effect is 
applied to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s GNI per capita of 440, the effect is .09988 
per 1,000 in the population. As for Qatar and its GNI per capita of 123,250, the effect is 27.977 
per 1,000.   
 Final Analysis 
 The definitive relationship between net migration and HDI scores is anything but a 
definitive relationship, as can be seen in the fluctuating relevance and significance in the tables 
above. When trying to determine if HDI scores do have a positive relationship with net 
migration, only table 1 supports the idea that a higher HDI score will increase a state’s net 
migration rate. Despite this support, since the adjusted R-squared value is so low, this support 
can be seen as very fickle, something that table 1 in 2015 and table 3 for both 2014 and 2015 
showcase, since HDI scores are no longer statistically significant. In short terms, HDI scores as 
indices are only positively correlated with net migration when examining data from the same 
year and there are no other possible influences provided as alternative impactors on net 
migration. 
When HDI scores are broken down into its components, GNI per capita, literacy rates, 
and life expectancy, there is a slightly better correlation between HDI scores and migration rates. 
In tables two and four, GNI per capita is statistically significant. Problematically for HDI scores, 
neither of the other two breakdown variables of literacy rates and life experiences are significant. 
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This makes it seem that net migration is correlated with GNI per capita and not HDI scores since 
not all of the variables were significant. Also, GNI per capita was only statistically significant 
when placed in the lag model with its values being from 2014 and those of net migration from 
2015. This difference further removes it from the same scope of HDI scores because HDI scores 
were only relevant when the data of its scores were from the same year as the net migration. 
Another diverging factor is that in the tables where GNI per capita was significant, no 
other variable or control was significant except for regime type, thus GNI per capita was the only 
variable impacting net migration in these regressions with only one control variable also having 
an effect on net migration. This further supports the idea that GNI per capita has its own impact 
on net migration without a reliance on HDI scores to prop its relationship. Along these lines, the 
adjusted R-squares in the tables in which only GNI per capita was significant out of the HDI 
score components were much higher values than the adjusted R-squared value in the table in 
which HDI scores was significant, which denotes a stronger connection between the GNI per 
capita and net migration. Knowing this, it calls into question when HDI scores were statistically 
significant if this was propped up by the close relation between net migration and GNI per 
capita. This issue of propping by GNI per capita for HDI scores can be written off slightly 
considering that HDI scores were only significant when HDI scores and net migration rates were 
from the same year, while GNI per capita was only significant when GNI per capita and net 
migration rates were from two different years. 
One thing that HDI scores do have a higher value on is its effect on the rates of migrants 
as can be seen when comparing HDI scores’ coefficients with those of GNI per capita. When 
significant, HDI scores increase net migration 12.235 per increase of one point in HDI scores. 
Conversely, every time that GNI per capita is significant, it increases net migration by .000248 
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and .000227 per one dollar increase in GNI per capita; it should be remembered this effect on net 
migration is per 1,000. This may be due to the increasing mobility of migrant populations, 
especially in the case of regional movements which typically support season or cyclical 
movements. Regional movements are supporting the rising trend of more South-to South 
migration rather than South-to-North migration. The role of GNI per capita, which has been 
slowly rising in many developing or lesser-developed countries, paired with the increasing 
regional migration supports this trend. This may be tied into relative regional HDI scores as well 
since GNI per capita is a variable used in the HDI indices. While the other aspects of HDI scores 
were not relevant in the tables above and GNI per capita was, it does not mean that net migration 
is impacted by GNI per capita and not HDI scores, especially when HDI scores from the same 
year as net migration are significant and GNI per capita from the same year as net migration is 
not. 
Conclusion 
Overall, the findings in this paper provide further illumination on the human phenomenon 
that is migration. While HDI scores of states do play only a minor and sometimes insignificant 
role, knowing this information is important for states to understand, especially when considering 
how their own development may make them appear as a destination or departure state. Besides 
the role of HDI scores, the secondary findings of the importance of refugees in populations, 
percentage of foreign populations in states, regime type (free, fairly free, and not free), and the 
corruption perception index all shed light upon what other factors are potentially taken into 
account for migrants. Along this line, the breakdown of HDI scores into its respective divisions 




The role time plays on migration can be briefly seen when the independent variables, 
from HDI scores to its breakdown variables, were significant. Since HDI scores were only 
significant when in the same year as migration, this may provide an idea of the connection and 
importance of HDI scores being an indicator of general expected wellbeing of those living in 
those states. This would come into play in the case of forced migrations, especially those that are 
very rapid with migrants being driven by crises in personal survival. Tied into this type of forced 
migration is the rising role of regional movements. In these cases, migrants are not looking 
necessarily for destination states to settle in for long term reasons, but as short-term solutions. In 
connection with this, some cases of forced migration impact large segments of societies, like 
environmental disasters, and relating to populations of lower socioeconomic status, their ability 
to migrate to far destinations or states with marginally higher HDI scores can be limited due to 
monetary issues. This can be connected to the rising trend of South-to-South movements, which 
are diverging from past historical trends of South-to-North directional migration movements. 
 As for the breakdown variables, the only time any of these variables was significant was 
in the models with a one-year lag. Along with this, only GNI per capita was statistically 
significant, which may point to the role economic security and opportunity plays on decisions for 
migrants, especially decisions in cases of non-forced migration. While this research paper did not 
examine the role of economic development or security outright, it would be advantageous to 
analyze if economic factors are more influential in migrations that are more planned or thought 
out rather than forced. Another interesting insight that the breakdown variables provide is that 
when GNI per capita was significant, no other factor other than regime type was statistically 
significant. This illuminates the direct connection between GNI per capita and net migration, and 
does provide the idea that maybe GNI per capita is a significant driving force behind migration. 
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Expanding upon this, in relation to the impact on net migration, GNI per capita did not 
increase or decrease migratory rates drastically – only by .000248 and .000227. This may 
possibly be linked to increasing mobility of migrants themselves, as can be seen in seasonal 
migrations, lowering barriers to migration with more favorable government policies, improved 
travel methods, wider information networks, and the increasing number of drivers. Just because 
education and health indicators in the HDI breakdown variables did not register as significant in 
this research does not mean that they are insignificant or are not drivers of migration. There are 
numerous reasons why people choose to migrate, many of which we have not uncovered the 
significance of or when such drivers are relevant, which reflects upon the nebulous and 
complicated nature that is the human phenomenon of migration.           
In spite of the global scale presented and the extensive cross-national comparisons 
afforded in this paper, there are limitations to the data and also the foundations to explaining 
migration itself. In regards to the data, some states are not featured due to the lack of data present 
on them and the data itself is commonly state reported. This raises the question on the legitimacy 
of the data, especially in cases where states would like to present a more positive front so their 
reporting numbers may be favorably skewed. Despite this, the majority of the data is from the 
United Nations in some scope, which brings back some legitimacy due to the strength of the UN 
institution. 
Another possible limitation in the data is the tracking of net migration, which is typically 
more difficult than what is assumed on paper. For instance, illegal migration poses a challenge of 
determining actual numbers for even large, organized countries. This effect is only heightened in 
smaller, less-organized states who may lack the resources to accurately track such an issue. 
Beyond the data, trying to utilize HDI as the main explanation behind net migration increases or 
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decreases is arguably presumptuous. In cases of forced migration, whether it be natural disasters, 
civil wars, or political and social persecutions, HDI would probably not play as huge a role in an 
individual's choice to leave than in cases of more regular migration. HDI scores may possibly 
help determine the destination countries. 
         Since comparing HDI values and net migration rates hopefully provide researchers with 
at least a baseline of understanding in the most basic sense, further research may be conducted in 
regards to the individual with more observable experiences and testimonies. By understanding 
the individuals’ reasoning behind movements, researchers may be able to glean information not 
previously taken into account or the significance of different factors, especially in cases of forced 
migrations. It could also potentially be done regionally to determine if certain cultural, social, 
and political elements play a larger role in the individual’s thought process in some parts of the 
world versus others. 
  In addition to this, it would be of interest to see how an individual's knowledge of states’ 
regulations of migration impact their choices, and ascertain if the individual is accurately 
informed of states’ laws. Also relative to the migrant, breaking down net migration by age 
groups would be a good next step in trying to understand how HDI scores and its components 
effect migration decisions. This may expose if age plays a role in what migration factors are 
most attractive to certain age groups. Along the informed vein, examining states’ changing 
policies in respect to migration – strategies aimed at attracting certain qualities in migrants, legal 
guidelines of migration and the ease or difficulty of said rules, and states’ policies in regards to 
populace push back or acceptance – would all be interesting avenues of research that would 
further illuminate the role of states in modern migration patterns. Since migration is such a 
global phenomenon, yet is uniquely a human experience, seeing how international barriers 
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interact with immigration and emigration would be key to study in hopes to clarify and better 
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